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Abstract
The term ‘‘theory of mind’’ (ToM) describes an evolved psychological mechanism that is necessary to represent intentions
and expectations in social interaction. It is thus involved in determining the proclivity of others to cooperate or defect. While
in cooperative settings between two parties the intentions and expectations of the protagonists match, they diverge in
deceptive scenarios, in which one protagonist is intentionally manipulated to hold a false belief about the intention of the
other. In a functional magnetic resonance imaging paradigm using cartoons showing social interactions (including the
outcome of the interaction) between two or three story characters, respectively, we sought to determine those brain areas
of the ToM network involved in reasoning about cooperative versus deceptive interactions. Healthy volunteers were asked
to reflect upon the protagonists’ intentions and expectations in cartoons depicting cooperation, deception or a
combination of both, where two characters cooperated to deceive a third. Reasoning about the mental states of the story
characters yielded substantial differences in activation patterns: both deception and cooperation activated bilateral
temporoparietal junction, parietal and cingulate regions, while deception alone additionally recruited orbitofrontal and
medial prefrontal regions. These results indicate an important role for prefrontal cortex in processing a mismatch between a
character’s intention and another’s expectations as required in complex social interactions.
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Introduction
The term ‘‘theory of mind’’ (ToM) describes both the ability to
understand and predict the behavior of other people by making
inferences about their mental states, their intentions, feelings,
expectations, beliefs or knowledge, and to cognitively represent
one’s own mental states [1]. It is widely acknowledged that ToM
evolved in hominids in response to the increasing complexity of
social interactions, representing a powerful cognitive tool to
determine whether or not a conspecific is willing to cooperate and
reciprocate [2], or tends to intentionally deceive and defect at the
expense of others [3]. In humans, this cognitive mechanism is more
orlesspermanently‘‘online’’,totheextentthatwesometimesascribe
mental states to inanimate objects such as cars, computers etc [4].
Given that ToM requires quite large computational resources, it is
not surprising that a dysfunction of the ToM mechanism is involved
in a variety of neuropsychiatric disorders, including autism and
schizophrenia and may cause severely compromised social compe-
tence in patients with such conditions [5–7].
A number of functional brain imaging studies have revealed that
ToM involves an extended neural network located in the frontal,
temporal and parietal lobes bilaterally [8,9]. Specifically, ToM
recruits several cortical midline structures, including the medial
prefrontal cortex (MPFC), the anterior cingulate (ACC), and the
precuneus as well as lateral areas of the middle temporal lobes
(MTL), the temporoparietal junction (TPJ), the superior temporal
sulcus (STS) and the temporal poles (reviewed in [7,9–11]). The
area extending from the anterior cingulate cortex to the anterior
frontal pole, particularly the paracingulate cortex, is supposed to
be engaged in self-reflection, person perception and in making
inferences about others’ thoughts [9]. Furthermore, regions near
the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) are thought to be involved in
reasoning about the contents of another person’s mind [12,13],
attribution of a character’s actual belief or state of knowledge
[11,14] and the discrimination between self and others [15].
Although hemispheric specialisation has been observed, the results
are contradictory: while some studies found selective activity in
right TPJ [14,16], others showed left TPJ to be necessary for
representing other persons’ beliefs [17,18]. The mPFC and the
ACC are thought to help distinguish self from other, to be engaged
in error monitoring, and to differentiate salient from non-salient
stimuli [8,19,20]. The role of the precuneus is less well known, but
this brain area seems to be important for the experience of agency
and self-consciousness [21,22]. The temporal regions around the
STS contain mirror neurons that play a decisive role in imitation
and learning as well as in recognition of intentional movements
[23,24]. In addition, amygdalar, insular and orbitofrontal activity
may contribute the affective ‘‘tone’’ to the evaluation of thoughts
and intentions [25]. For example, the insula has been shown to be
activated if unfairness is being recognised [26].
A prototypical task used in ToM research has been the ’’false
belief task’’, which requires the subject to predict where a
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character unbeknownst to the first character. While successful
performance in this task is considered a milestone in the
development of ToM in young children [27,28], it does not entail
‘‘higher order’’ processes in the framework of interpersonal
expectations and intentions such as beliefs of a character about the
mental states of a third party–which is crucial to determine whether
ornota personhasanunderstandingoftheintentionsofothers(i.e.‘‘
I know that X does not know that Y wants to cheat upon him, and
that Y knows that X cannot know what Y really intends to do’’).
It is as yet unknown whether an individual’s understanding of
another person’s mental states about cooperative or deceptive
intentions of a third party, resulting from false or true interpretations
of the third party’s actions and behavior, are processed in discrete
brain regions of the ToM network. In this study, we therefore sought
to examine whether a subject’s evaluation of cooperative and
deceptive interactions between two or three story characters elicits
differential activation patterns within the ToM neural network.
Accordingly, healthy participants were shown cartoon stories
depicting scenarios of cooperation, deception or both; the partici-
pants’ task was to attribute intentions and beliefs to the protagonists.
The stories described either a) situations where one person wants
another to cooperate to the advantage of both, b) situations where
one person deceives another person, and c) situations where two
persons cooperate to deceivea third person. Since the outcome of the
scenarios was visible to the participants, the experimental design was
suitable to examine the test subject’s ability to represent a ‘‘true’’ or
‘‘false’’ belief held by one of the story characters. Moreover, the
deception condition overtly signalled unfairness, whereas the
cooperation condition clearly depicted reciprocity and fairness. By
means of fMRI we investigated whether these concepts draw on
different brain regions, i.e. whether the representation of a character’s
erroneous belief in the (unfair) deception condition recruits different
brain regions compared to the mental representation of a character’s
correct inference of intentions in the (reciprocal) cooperation
condition.. In addition, the combined cooperation/deception stories
were introduced to determine brain regions commonly activated by
the formation of a cognitive representation of both a cooperative and
deceitful intention. In an additional baseline condition, we showed
the samecartoons in jumbled order, the taskof the participants was to
answer questions regarding physical properties of the stimuli.
Since involvement of temporoparietal junction and precuneus in
intention and belief attribution has repeatedly been demonstrated,
we expected these regions to be activated across all scenarios. In
contrast, we hypothesised that the representation of a scenario
depicting a character’s concealed deceitful intention would recruit
additional brain activation [14]. As a potential candidate for these
more complex scenarios we predicted that the medial prefrontal
cortex would be more strongly activated due to its involvement in
disambiguating information, including discrepancies between one’s
own expectation and others’ (covert) intentions [29]. Moreover, we
expected that limbic and orbitofrontal structures such as the insula
would differentially be activated by the deceitful scenario, which was
associated with a high level of unfairness. We also assumed that
increasing complexityof the social interaction inscenarios describing
both cooperation and deception and an interaction of three
characters would lead to more widespread brain activation due to
the higher processing load involved.
Results
Imaging
We analyzed results by directly contrasting all three types of
stories, cooperation (COOP), deception (DEC) and cooperation/
deception (COOPDEC) with each other, using a height threshold
of p,0.02 and an extent threshold of k=15. The contrasts were
calculated for the ROIs derived from the preceding exploratory
whole-brain analysis that compared activation during the ToM
tasks with activation during the non-ToM tasks. These ROIs
encompassed superior, medial and inferior frontal regions, and
ACC, insula, as well as parietal and temporal regions including the
TPJ and precuneus. In several of these ROIs, mentalizing about
stories with a deception element yielded differential activation
from mentalizing about stories with a cooperation element. Other
regions were commonly activated by both types of stories, with
spatially distinct peaks of activation (see Fig. 1 and 2, Table 1).
As expected, stories containing both cooperation and deception
elements recruited the largest regions, in comparison to the other
conditions. Specifically, brain activation patterns of the stories
containing both elements (COOPDEC) tended to show higher
BOLD responses in the majority of ToM-activated regions, i.e. in
bilateral TPJ, right anterior temporal cortex, left inferior and
superior frontal cortex compared to COOP and DEC, respec-
tively. These results suggest that the processing load for the more
complex situation depicted in the COOPDEC scenarios might be
higher than for the more straightforward one-to one interactions.
Compared to DEC.COOP, the contrast COOPDEC.COOP
showed larger activation in bilateral temporoparietal regions,
while both contrasts yielded similar activation in inferior and
superior frontal gyrus. Compared to COOP.DEC, the contrast
COOPDEC.DEC shows larger activation in inferior frontal
gyrus and righthemispheric parietal and temporal regions.
Frontal activation. The results from direct contrasts between
stories containing elements of deception or cooperation or both
showed differential activation patterns. Participants showed higher
medial (lefthemispheric BA 9 and 10) and left inferior frontal (BA
47) activation when mentalizing about stories containing an
element of deception compared to cooperation. On the other
hand, mentalizing about cooperation alone, but not about the
combined cooperation/deception stories, led to higher activation
in superior frontal gyrus (lefthemispheric BA 9 and 10) when
compared to deception alone.
Moreover, within stories containing an element of deception,
superior and medial prefrontal activation (left hemisperic BA 9)
was higher in DEC compared to COOPDEC, while inferior
frontal gyrus activation (lefthemispheric BA 47) was higher in
COOPDEC than in DEC.
On the other hand, within stories containing the element of
cooperation there was higher activation in left superior frontal gyrus
(BA 9) in COOP than in COOPDEC, while the opposite applied in
bilateral inferior frontal gyrus (BA 47) and left medial frontal gyrus
(BA 32), where COOPDEC stories led to higher activation than
COOP stories. A higher activation of COOP in left superior frontal
gyrus (BA 10) was also found compared to DEC.
In general, these results suggest that stories containing a
deception element activated predominantly left inferior and
medial frontal gyrus. In spatially distinct regions of left superior
frontal gyrus, higher activation was found in tasks containing only
the cooperation element or the deception element, respectively (see
Fig. 1 and 2, Table 1).
Limbic activation. In left posterior cingulate gyrus (BA 31),
both types of stories containing a deception element led to higher
activation than stories dealing with cooperation alone, while both
types of stories containing a cooperation element led to higher
activation in right posterior cingulate gyrus (BA 31) compared to
the deception stories.
Further differentiation between stories was found in right ACC
(BA 33) and bilateral posterior cingulate gyrus (BA 23), where the
Theory-of-Mind
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posterior cingulate (BA 30), where activation was higher for
COOP than for COOPDEC (see Fig. 2, Table 1).
Temporoparietal junction activation. Both types of stories
containing a deception elementled to higheractivation inleftmiddle
temporal gyrus (BA 39) than cooperation alone, while they activate
right middle temporal gyrus (BA 39) less than cooperation alone.
Furthermore, stories containing a cooperation element led to
higher activation than DEC in several regions of the TPJ: in left
superior and middle temporal gyrus (BA 12, 22, 39) and in right
middle temporal gyrus, however, there are no TPJ regions where
stories containing a cooperation element commonly show less
activation than deception stories (see Fig. 1, Table 1).
Other temporal regions. Right middle temporal gyrus (BA
39) exhibits higher activation regarding stories containing a
deception element than mere cooperation stories. Within stories
containing deception, some regions in right middle temporal gyrus
(BA 21, 37) are activated stronger by COOPDEC than by DEC,
while a more superior situated region in left middle temporal gyrus
appear to be activated stronger by DEC than COOPDEC (BA 22).
There are no temporal regions that commonly exhibit higher
activation in stories containing a cooperation element compared to
deception. However, some temporal regions show differential
activation when comparing COOP and COOPDEC, such as left
superior temporal gyrus (BA 41), which is activated stronger by
COOP than by COOPDEC, while regions in right superior (BA
Figure 1. Brain activation in frontal, temporoparietal and temporal regions. Activation patterns are rendered on the brain surface in the
contrasts of stories describing deception (DEC), cooperation (COOP) and both (COOPDEC). n=13, extent threshold k=15; height threshold p,0.02.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002023.g001
Theory-of-Mind
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 3 April 2008 | Volume 3 | Issue 4 | e202321, 22) and middle temporal gyrus (BA 37) are activated stronger
by COOPDEC than COOP. In general, stories containing a
deception element apparently lead to higher temporal activation
than those without. In particular righthemispheric middle
temporal regions are predominantly involved in deception
processing and/or even more in the combination of deception
and cooperation (see Fig 1, Table 1).
Parietal regions. Both types of stories containing a deception
element yield higher activation in left precuneus (BA 7) than stories
with only a cooperation element, however, when comparing decep-
tion type stories with each other, this same region is activated higher
in DEC than in COOPDEC stories, and also activation in an
adjacent precuneus region (BA 31 left) is higher in COOP compared
to COOPDEC. No parietal region shows higher activation in
COOPDEC compared to DEC and COOP, respectively.
It appears that lefthemispheric precuneus BA 7 is activated
predominantly when deception has to be processed, while BA 31
seems rather to be involved in processing cooperation.
Mean signal intensity
An ANOVA comparing mean signal intensity in left medial (BA
9/10) and inferior frontal (BA 47) gyrus and in left temporoparietal
junction (BA 22) in all three ToM task conditions revealed main
effects of condition (F(2)=7.917 p,0.001, region (F(2)=4.830
p,0.01 and a significant condition*region interaction (F(4)=
9.910 p,0.001). Paired t-tests comparing activation in the same
region for different conditions showed significantly higher
activation in medial prefrontal cortex during DEC compared to
COOP and COOPDEC (t(12)=2.537 p,0.01 and t(12)=2.290
p,0.01, respectively); in inferior frontal cortex during DEC and
COOPDEC compared to COOP (t(12)=3.041 p,0.01 and
t(12)=4.005 p,0.001), and in temporoparietal junction in
COOPDEC compared to DEC (t(12)=2.079 p,0.01) and COOP
(t(12)=4.173 p,0.001). T-tests comparing activation in the same
condition for different regions showed significantly higher
activation in medial PFC than in TPJ for DEC (t(12)=3.179
p,0.01), and higher activation in TPJ than in inferior frontal
Figure 2. Brain activation in medial frontal, cingulate and parietal regions. Brain activation patterns are shown for the contrasts of stories
describing deception (DEC), cooperation (COOP) and both (COOPDEC). n=13, extent threshold k=15; height threshold p,0.02.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002023.g002
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t(12)=2.757 p,0.01) (see Fig. 3).
Behavioral measures
Participants performed at ceiling level in the paper-and-pencil
ToM story comprehension task that followed the fMRI session.
The mean score was 23.0 for answering the ToM questionnaire
alone (standard error 0.00) and 59.0 for the ToM questionnaire
combined with the sequencing task (standard error 0.00).
Discussion
In a functional magnetic resonance imaging paradigm using
cartoons showing social interactions (including the outcome of the
interaction) between two or three story characters, respectively, we
sought to determine whether brain areas of the ToM network
would be differentially involved depending on the nature and
complexity of the observed interaction. The overall activation
pattern observed in our ToM task showing activated regions in
temporoparietal junction, precuneus, temporal cortex, cingulate
areas, and prefrontal cortex corresponds largely to the findings of
previous studies and the general notion of the theory-of-mind
network [7–11]. Since story comprehension of cooperative and
deceitful scenarios was flawless in all participants, as indicated by
the behavioral data, the observed activations most likely reflect
adequate belief reasoning in all three task types. When considering
the results from contrasting the three task conditions, it can be
assumed that an area that is primarily involved in processing
deception will most likely show up in the contrast DEC.COOP,
but not its opposite, and potentially also in the contrasts
DEC.COOPDEC or COOPDEC.DEC. An area primarily
involved in processing cooperation should show up in the contrast
COOP.DEC, but not its opposite, and potentially also in
COOP.COOPDEC or COOPDEC.COOP.
Temporoparietal junction, precuneus and posterior
cingulate regions are involved in the comprehension of
cooperation and deception
Mentalizing about scenarios describing both cooperation and
deception (COOPDEC) always showed higher activated areas in
the temporoparietal junction when compared to the DEC or
COOP conditions alone. Moreover, the opposite contrasts of
COOP.DEC and DEC.COOP exhibited activation in TPJ.
COOP and COOPDEC tend to activate bilateral TPJ stronger
than DEC, with COOPDEC moreover showing higher activation
than COOP in these regions. In general, these results correspond
to studies reporting temporoparietal activation in ToM tasks
requiring belief reasoning [14,17]. However, in contrast to
lateralized effects found in recent imaging studies on belief
reasoning, with right TPJ selectively activated in false belief [14]
and belief attribution during moral judgments [30], and the
findings from lesion studies implicating left TPJ in belief reasoning
[17,18], our results showed bilateral TPJ activation in both
cooperation and deception conditions. A possible reason for the
disparity of the observed activation pattern compared with
previous studies could lie in differences in task requirements.
Our stories were designed to force subjects to reason about
(cooperative and deceitful) intentions of the story characters,
whereas the study by Sommer et al. (2007) used stories where the
knowledge of a story character had to be inferred. Hence, the
higher processing demands placed on the ToM network by our
task may well have recruited more bilaterally distributed TPJ
activation than a standard task requiring comprehension of a false
belief about the location of an object..
Accordingly, our findings expand upon previous findings on the
role of the temporoparietal junction in ToM, suggesting that
processing deception, cooperation or both activates bilateral TPJ.
Precuneus activation was also observed in all contrasts of
cooperation, deception, and cooperation/deception compared
with the other conditions. These findings correspond to the study
by Sommer et al. [14], who also found precuneus activation in
both false and true belief reasoning about object location. An
fMRI study by Ochsner et al. [31] found left precuneus to be one
of the regions activated by attributing emotions to other people
and the self, together with posterior cingulate and prefrontal
cortex. According to Vogeley & Fink [32], the medial parietal
cortex-together with medial prefrontal cortex-has a role in taking
the first-person perspective and differentiating between actions
controlled by the self versus other persons. However, in a PET
study by Ruby and Decety [16], there was more bilateral
precuneus activation when taking a third person perspective than
first person perspective. In an fMRI study that compared thinking
about physical causality (physical event and its consequences)
versus intentional causality (a subject’s intentions and its
consequences), the precuneus/posterior cingulate cortex was
found to subserve reasoning about intentional causality [33], a
function that usually develops before false belief understanding. In
accordance with the literature, our results therefore suggest that in
ToM tasks, the precuneus performs a rather broad function,
relating to perspective taking as well as attribution and processing
of emotions and intentions, that is required for belief reasoning
including comprehension of cooperation and intentional decep-
tion.
Another region commonly activated to varying degrees in all
contrasts across conditions is the posterior cingulate gyrus /
Figure 3. Activation in frontal and temporal regions during the
different ToM conditions. The graph shows the mean signal
intensity (+/2 s.e.m.) (in arbitrary units) in these regions in the
conditions DEC (black), COOP (white) and COOPDEC (grey), respectively.
The ANOVA with the factors condition and region showed main effects
of condition (F(2)=7.917 p,0.001, region (F(2)=4.830 p,0.01 and a
significant condition*region interaction (F(4)=9.910 p,0.001 with
significantly higher activation in medial prefrontal cortex during DEC
compared to COOP and COOPDEC (t(12)=2.537 p,0.01 and
t(12)=2.290 p,0.01, respectively); in inferior frontal cortex during
DEC and COOPDEC compared to COOP (t(12)=3.041 p,0.01 and
t(12)=4.005 p,0.001), and in temporoparietal junction in COOPDEC
compared to DEC (t(12)=2.079 p,0.01) and COOP (t(12)=4.173
p,0.001). Activation during DEC was significantly higher in medial
PFC than in TPJ (t(12)=3.179 p,0.01), and during COOP and COOPDEC
significantly higher in TPJ than in inferior frontal gyrus (t(12)= 3.726
p,0.01 and t(12)=2.757 p,0.01).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002023.g003
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has previously been found in theory of mind research when
reading stories about social interaction [34,35], in particular
reading about a protagonist’s thoughts [36], and also specifically in
tasks focussing on empathy [37]–here together with anterior
cingulate, paracingulate gyrus and amygdala. These results hint at
a role for posterior cingulate apparently related to social/
emotional processing aspects of ToM, which in our study were
present in both forms of belief reasoning.
Processing deception additionally recruits prefrontal
cortex, insula and anterior cingulate
Mentalizing about a situation involving intentional deception on
the part of the acting character and not recognizing the deceitful
intent on the part of the passive character additionally activates left
orbitofrontal lateral, inferior, and medial frontal cortex, as seen in
the contrasts of DEC vs COOP and COOPDEC, respectively,
and in the contrast COOPDEC vs DEC. These results indicate
that these prefrontal regions might have a central role in
processing a mismatch between intentions and expectations of
the protagonists, and also in processing emotional aspects of
unfairness [26].
Regions in left lateral superior frontal gyrus, however, showed
up in all contrasts, suggesting that adjacent, but spatially distinct
areas in this region are involved in processing of cooperation and
deception, respectively.
Involvement of different frontal regions in ToM tasks has been
observed in previous PET and fMRI imaging studies
[15,34,35,38,39]. These studies, however, did not specify varia-
tions of cooperative or deceitful intentions shown in their tasks, nor
did they explicitly request to evaluate expectations and intentions
of the protagonists in a social setting. These studies revealed either
left [34,35] or right [39] activation of medial frontal and inferior
frontal cortex during ToM tasks performance, or right orbito-
frontal activation during recognition of mental states [38], as well
as specific medial frontal activation [15].
One recent neuroimaging study considering belief processing in
ToM associated right lateral rostral prefrontal cortex, but not
medial prefrontal cortex, with reasoning about a character’s false
belief [14]. The authors used a standard false belief task that
described hiding and dislocation of objects, which required
subjects to predict a behavior without intention attribution–as
already pointed out, this constitutes an important difference to our
task that may account for differential results.
Two further studies found activation of medial prefrontal cortex
in subjects playing games that involved trust and reciprocity,
particularly when cooperative intentions had to be evaluated
[40,41]. At first sight these findings might seem contradictory to
our results of deception-specific medial frontal activation.
However, evaluating cooperative intentions also requires checking
for a match or mismatch between one’s own expectations and the
other’s intentions-which might include deception. Therefore such
a task may be more similar to our deception task than to our
cooperation task, where cooperation was evident and needed no
additional evaluation in terms of the truthfulness of the
cooperative intent.
Moreover, our results are consistent with lesion studies showing
that damage to the medial frontal lobe impaired detection of
deception in a ToM task [42] and caused deficits in ‘‘affective’’
theory of mind, including evaluation of another person’s emotional
situation [43]. It is conceivable that these divergent findings on
medial and orbitofrontal involvement in ToM reasoning result
from different task paradigms that concentrate either on cognitive
or affective aspects of the ToM task. In contrast to classic second-
order false belief tasks, which require only a cognitive under-
standing of the difference between one person’s knowledge and
that of another, our ToM task required both cognitive and
affective ToM in true and false belief conditions. Therefore, the
higher activation of medial and orbitofrontal prefrontal regions in
tasks requiring both the processing of a malicious intent of one
character and the ignorance of that intent by another character
might well be related to the stronger emotional valence and
perception of unfairness in the deception scenario compared to
cooperation.
Interestingly, as shown by Abe et al., orbitofrontal medial PFC
has also been found activated when subjects themselves were
deceiving another person, [44]. In combination with our
findings, these results indicate a general involvement of this
region in deception processing, regardless of whether one’s own
actions or actions of others are concerned. These findings blend
in well with the general role suggested for the anterior rostral
medial prefrontal cortex (arMFC)–a region which corresponds
largely to the area activated in our deception task-by Amodio &
Frith [9]. Their review suggests that the arMFC is involved
particularly in thinking about mental states and intentions–of self
and others.
Orbitofrontal/ventromedial PFC (BA 10/11) and dorsolateral
PFC (BA 9/10/46) have also been found to participate in moral
judgements [45–47]. Before a moral judgment can be made, the
inappropriate and harmful intention of an actor has to be detected
and linked to empathetic engagement with the deceived person. In
our study, participants did not have to judge the moral
implications of the scheming person’s behavior, because the
outcome of each scenario was evident. Thus, subjects were merely
requested to describe the deceiver’s intention and the victim’s
ignorance. It is therefore conceivable that the activation during
moral judgment in previous studies results from a more complex
process in which a malicious intention has to be detected. Inferior
frontal gyrus (BA 47) in ventrolateral orbitofrontal cortex has also
been found activated in response to moral and social transgres-
sions [48], suggesting that the activation in left BA 47 during
deception processing observed in our study may well relate to the
moral implications of the depicted events.
However, orbitofrontal cortex activation has to date rarely been
found to be involved in theory of mind [23]. It has been suggested
that orbitofrontal cortex belongs to a system responding to
aversive reactions of others and is therefore also activated in
intentional or unintentional violations of social norms [49]. These
notions of orbitofrontal cortex involvement in evaluation of moral
behavior and violation of social norms loosely correspond to our
finding of involvement of orbitofrontal cortex in mentalizing about
people who take advantage of the false beliefs of others to
transgress social norms.
Bilateral anterior cingulate regions also showed higher
activation in conditions containing a deception element, in
particular in the contrast DEC.COOP. These results corre-
spond to those by Sommer et al. [14], who found ACC
activation in the contrast false vs. true belief. In their comparison
of neuronal correlates of ToM and empathy, Vo ¨llm et al. [37]
found empathy associated with enhanced activations of para-
cingulate, anterior and posterior cingulate; thus it might be
conceivable that higher activation of anterior cingulate regions
during processing of false belief situations relates to empathizing
with the deceived character. The left insula region (BA 13) also
exhibited higher activation in deception compared to the other
conditions. In accordance with the results by Sanfey et al. [26],
this activation could relate to the perception of unfairness in the
deception scenarios.
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Our results suggest that bilateral TPJ, precuneus, and posterior
cingulate are regions involved in belief reasoning and evaluation of
both cooperative and deceptive intentions of others embedded in a
social interaction, at least if the outcome of the social interaction is
directly observable. In contrast, orbitofrontal and medial prefron-
tal cortex, and anterior cingulate regions seem to be predom-
inantly active during processing of a character’s ignorance of a
malicious intent against him, and attribution of deceptive
intentions to a third party. To the best of our knowledge, this
study is the first to further dissect the cognitive architecture of
processing cooperation versus intentional deception. Our findings
provide evidence for the hypothesis that different processes of
ToM, namely the comprehension of cooperation and deception,
are associated with different activation patterns of the neural
network involved in social cognition.
Methods
Participants
13 healthy participants (mean age 26.46 years, SD 5.3 years,
range 22–38 years; 4 male participants, mean age 26.25 years, SD
4.78; 9 female participants, mean age 26.55 years, SD 5.79)
without a history of neurological or psychiatric disorder or first-
degree relatives with such illnesses took part in this study after
giving written informed consent. The protocol was approved by
the local ethics committee of the Ruhr-University Bochum. Prior
to the experiment, participants received a handout informing them
about the MRI procedure and the instructions for the ToM task.
Theory of Mind Task
The theory of mind (ToM) task consisted of six different cartoon
stories with four pictures each [50], showing scenarios of: a)
cooperation of two persons depicting reciprocality, b) deception,
where one person deceives another person associated with overt
unfairness, and c) cooperation of two persons to the disadvantage
of a third person,-i.e. two cartoon stories of each type (Examples
see Fig. 4). In order to compare activation elicited by ToM
demands with non-ToM activation, we introduced a control (non-
ToM) condition, where the pictures of the stories were presented
in jumbled order.
For the purpose of acquiring fMRI data during performance of
the task, the cartoon stories were projected onto a screen during
the MR scanning session and presented to the participant via a 45u
angled mirror fixed on the head coil. The mirror was adjusted to
enable each participant to view the screen without having to move
the head. Prior to scanning, a test image was displayed on the
screen to ensure that the images were in focus and that the
participant could comfortably see the pictures and read the
questions. All four pictures of a given story were shown
simultaneously on the screen, arranged in two rows in left to
right order. In each condition (cooperation, deception, coopera-
tion/deception and non-ToM control), at first the cartoon story
was presented alone for 15 sec, then two questions were
successively superimposed upon the screen (between the first and
the second row of pictures) for 12 seconds each. The task of the
participant was to regard the story attentively during the first
phase and to think about the answer to each question as long as
the question was displayed on the screen.
In the ToM conditions, the questions referred to intentions and
beliefs of the protagonists. While one question always referred to
the intention of the acting character(s) (e.g. ‘‘What does the boy
with the red pullover have in mind?’’), which could be positive
(cooperation) or negative (deception) for the other; the second
question pertained to the belief of the reacting character (e.g.
‘‘What does the boy in the blue pullover expect from the boy in the
Figure 4. Examples of the ToM cartoon stories presented to the subjects. Panels show (A) cooperation, (B) deception, and (C) cooperation/
deception. (D) shows an example of a jumbled cartoon story presented in the non-ToM condition.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002023.g004
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the incorrect assumption that the other person wanted a positive
social interaction (to cooperate, to play, to give a present) or had a
problem and needed help. True beliefs correctly assumed a desire
for a cooperative social interaction. In the non-ToM control
condition, the questions referred to properties of objects displayed
on the scene (e.g., ‘‘Is the background blue or yellow?’’).
The cartoon stories for the ToM and non-ToM condition were
presented alternatingly in a blocked design with a total of 12
phases (6 ToM phases and 6 non-ToM control phases) of 39 sec
duration each, always beginning with a non-ToM phase, with
conditions of cooperation, deception and cooperation/deception
presented in randomized order. Each experimental scanning
session had a duration of approx. 7 min 48 secs.
Behavioural measures
After the scanning procedure, the participants completed a
paper and pencil version of the ToM task. In the first part of this
task, the four pictures of each story were presented in a jumbled
order and participants had to put them into the correct sequence.
For each cartoon story sequenced correctly, subjects received 6
points (max. score 36 points). In addition, 23 open questions
pertaining to the mental states of the cartoon characters were
given, i.e. the 12 questions from the scanning session plus
additional questions. Here each correct answer scored 1 point
(max. total 23 points). The maximum total score for sequencing
and questionnaire was 59 points (for details, see [51]).
fMRI Data Acquisition
Data were acquired using awhole body1.5Tscanner (Magnetom
Symphony, Siemens, Germany) equipped with a high power
gradient system (30 mT/m/s; SR 125 T/m/s), using a standard
imaging head coil. Blood-oxygen level dependent (BOLD) images
were obtained with a single-shot SpinEcho-EPI sequence (TR
3000 ms, TE 60 ms, matrix 64664, field of view 224 mm, slice
thickness 3.0 mm, 0.3 mm gap between slices, voxel size
3.563.563.0 mm). To reduce noise and obtain an adequate
signal-to-noise ratio we restrained the subjects’ heads in order to
prevent head motion, chose a voxel size of 3.563.563 mm and used
a block length of 13 scans (= 39 seconds) as well as a spatial
smoothing algorithm of 6 mm FWHM in the single subject
preprocessing. We acquired 30 transaxial slices parallel to the
anterior commissure–posterior commissure (AC-PC) line. The area
covered by the fMRI scans encompassed the complete cortex area
extending from the superior pole of the cortex to the inferior pole of
the temporal cortex. Additionally, anatomical images of each subject
were acquired using an isotropic T1-3dGE (MPRAGE) sequence
(TR 1800 ms, TE 3.87 ms, matrix 2566256, field of view 256 mm,
slice thickness 1 mm, no gap, voxel size 16161 mm) with 160
sagittally oriented slices covering the whole brain.
fMRI Data Analysis
For preprocessing and statistical analysis of the fMRI data, we
used the Statistical Parametric Mapping (SPM) Software, Version
5 (Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology, London, UK)
implemented in Matlab (Mathworks, Sherbon, MA). The first 5
images of each fMRI session (total 157 images), during which the
BOLD signal reaches steady state, were discarded from further
analysis. Single subject preprocessing consisted of the following
steps: realignment for motion correction, normalization to
standard stereotaxic coordinates (MNI coordinates), smoothing
at 6 mm
3 voxels, and first-level single subject data analysis. The
acceptable limit of head motion was 2 mm for translational
movements and 0.5u for rotational movements.
To assess the differences between the individual ToM conditions
(i.e. cooperation versus deception, deception versus cooperation/
deception and cooperation versus cooperation/deception), we
performed second-level paired t-test analyses by using first-level
contrasts obtained for cooperation, deception and cooperation/
deception minus the global non-ToM condition. To do this, in a first-
level single subject analysis, contrast images were calculated for
activation in the ToM conditions relative to the non ToM condition
for each participant. The analysis encompassed the complete
presentation phases of the cartoons, i.e. both processing of the story
and answering the questions. The individual contrast images were
then entered into an exploratory second-level random-effects analysis
(one-sample t-test) of the activation patterns for all subjects, with a
liberal threshold of p,0.02 (uncorrected) and with a minimum
cluster size of k=15 voxels-in order to find the areas involved in
mentally answering questions requiring theory of mind in general.
We restricted our further analysis to ToM-relevant areas found
significantly activated in this first exploratory analysis comparing
all ToM conditions to all non-ToM conditions. These hypothesis-
driven regions of interest (ROIs) were identified by extracting
activated clusters using the MARSBAR tool [52]. These clusters
encompassed significantly activated regions in left TPJ, BA 21,22
(peak voxel at 258 240 16), left precuneus, BA 7/31 (peak voxel
at 26 254 36), right Insula, BA 13 (peak voxel at 38 222 24), left
anterior cingulate, BA 33 (peak voxel at 22 6 20), right middle
temporal gyrus, BA 21/37/39 (peak voxel at 60 264 6 and 62 26
16), bilateral inferior frontal gyrus BA 47 (peak voxels at 246 30
210 and 40 20 220), left medial frontal gyrus BA 9/10 (peak
voxel 22 62 22) and BA 32 (peak voxel 212 16 50) and left
superior frontal gyrus, BA 9/10 (peak voxel at 216 53 34). Using
the MARSBAR procedure, box-shaped ROIs were refined based
on these clusters by applying the end coordinates in the x,y,z
dimensions of the activated areas as corner points of the boxes. To
compare the different ToM conditions (cooperation, deception,
cooperation-deception) with each other, contrasts within the
described ROIs were calculated in a first-level single-subject
analysis for each of the conditions separately, in each case
compared to the overall non-ToM condition, resulting in three
basic comparisons per subject. The resulting contrast images were
then entered into second-level random-effects group analyses, i.e.
into paired t-tests, by means of which we calculated direct
contrasts between the activation patterns in all three conditions,
resulting in six contrasts (DEC vs. COOP; DEC vs. COOPDEC;
COOP vx DEC, COOP vs. COOPDEC, COOPDEC vs. DEC,
and COOPDEC vs. COOP). Functional imaging results are
reported as t-scores with a threshold of p,0.02 (uncorrected) and a
minimum cluster size of 15 contiguous voxels. In view of the height
threshold chosen, a minimum cluster size of 15 voxels was selected
in order to further protect against including areas of spurious
activation in our analysis. Maxima of significant activation were
transformed into Talairach space [53], anatomical labelling was
performed using the Talairach Demon database [54].
Mean signal intensities (in arbitrary units) were calculated for all
conditions using the MARSBAR toolbox for SPM for several
regions of interest that showed activation differences between the
task conditions. The resulting mean values for the activated
regions were entered in an ANOVA (SPSS 11.5) comparison of
the different conditions and regions.
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